President Trump's actions have clearly upended the existing international order. Can you guess the broad contours of the emerging world order?
- Prakriti N
- Jul 9
- 7 min read
From America First to Kautilyan World Order
President Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025 has accelerated a global shift from liberal internationalism to transactional realism. His swift withdrawal from NATO commitments, the dismantling of climate accords, and the revival of economic nationalism reflect a world increasingly governed by power politics over multilateral ideals (Nye, 2020). Rather than viewing this shift as unprecedented, it is better understood as a reversion to an older, pragmatic logic of international affairs.
This essay examines the emerging global order through the lens of ancient Hindu political thought, particularly Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra and select Vedic texts from Manusmriti and Mahabharata. Concepts such as Raj Dharma (the duty of the ruler), Matsya Nyāya (the law of the stronger fish), and Mandala theory (strategic alliances) resonate strongly with current geopolitical trends (Kautilya, 1992). In doing so, it argues that today’s multipolar landscape more closely mirrors the realist traditions of ancient India than the idealist visions of the post-World War II West.
1. The Return of Realpolitik: An Overview of Trump 2025
President Trump’s 2025 foreign policy approach marks a return to crude transactional diplomacy, emphasising sinister national interest above all else. His disregard for collective security & economic frameworks (e.g., questioning NATO’s value and undermining the United Nations) demonstrates the transition from liberal internationalism to a hard-power-driven order.
Key indicators:
· Abandonment of NATO Article 5 guarantees for Baltic States.
· Renewed trade wars with China and Europe.
· America First doctrine elevated to near-doctrinal status.
These moves have emboldened regional powers—Russia, China, and India—to assert more autonomous foreign policies, aligning closely with what Kautilya described as the mandala theory of concentric circles of allies and enemies (Kautilya, 1992).
Kautilya said use deception; he probably didn’t mean livestream it.
2. Kautilya’s Mandala Theory and the New Great Game
Kautilya’s mandala theory, as outlined in Book VI of the Arthaśāstra, posits that a king’s neighbour is a natural enemy, and the neighbour’s neighbour is a potential ally (Kautilya, 1992). This cyclical and strategic framework resembles the emerging multipolar dynamics of 2025.
Comparative insights:
· U.S.–India rapprochement echoes Kautilya’s idea of aligning with the "enemy of my enemy" (i.e., both wary of China's rise).
· Russia–China strategic deepening fits into the idea of balancing against a common external threat (U.S. dominance).
· European Union’s military initiatives post-Trump reflect vijigishu (aspiring conqueror) behaviour, building independent capacity.
Kautilya advised rulers to be pragmatic, opportunistic, and even deceptive when national interest demanded it (Kautilya, 1992)—traits Trump unapologetically embodies.
3. Matsya Nyaya and the Collapse of Normative Order
The Matsya Nyāya (law of fishes)—a concept from Manusmriti (Manusmriti, Wendy D. and Brian K., 2005) and reiterated in the—describes a world without law where the strong devour the weak Mahabharata (Mahabharata, John D. Smith, 2004). This notion applies aptly to 2025, where international norms are increasingly ignored.
Examples:
· Russia’s unchecked aggression in Eastern Europe, exploiting U.S. withdrawal.
· China’s militarization of the South China Sea and economic coercion.
· Weaponisation of supply chains and economic dependencies by powerful states.
In the Mahabharata, Yudhishthira's reluctance to go to war without justification is often contrasted with Krishna's assertion that Dharma sometimes demands force to prevent greater Adharma (Mahabharata, John D. Smith, 2004). Similarly, Trump’s actions challenge whether the post-WWII liberal order was sustainable or merely a brief exception.
In the age of Matsya Nyaya, small countries aren’t pawns—they're the buffet. The law of fishes? More like the buffet of piranhas—everyone’s invited!
4. Raj Dharma and the Morality of Power
The concept of Raj Dharma, or the duty of the ruler, as expressed in texts like the Mahabharata and Ramayana, reflects an ethical realism. A ruler must prioritize the stability and prosperity of their state, even if it means acting unethically in appearance (Mahabharata, John D. Smith, 2004).
Parallels to Trump’s doctrine:
· Justification of deals with autocratic regimes (e.g., North Korea, Saudi Arabia) under the pretense of protecting national interests.
· Use of sanctions not for moral policing but economic leverage.
· Skepticism of humanitarian interventions or nation-building.
Kautilya, too, advised kings to employ Sama (conciliation), Dama (money-resources-arms/weapons), Bheda (division), and Danda (punishment) as tools to maintain supremacy—similar to Trump’s style of alternating between threats and incentives (Kautilya, 1992).
Apparently, 'Raj Dharma' now includes golf, sanctions, and selective memory.
5. The Decline of Universalism: From Dharma to Pragmatism
Ancient Hindu political thought does not preach universal morality as a governing principle of state behaviour. Instead, it acknowledges Svadharma—contextual righteousness (Doniger, W., & Smith, B. K., 1991). Similarly, the emerging world order is one of pragmatic pluralism:
· India hedging between the U.S., Russia, and Iran.
· Turkey acting as a swing state between NATO and the SCO.
· Africa asserting regional security pacts rather than relying on Western interventions.
This decentralised order resembles the chakravartin model, where a dominant power exists but does not necessarily interfere in the Svadharma of smaller kingdoms (Kautilya, 1992)—Trump’s selective engagement echoes this.
6. Strategic Implications for Diplomacy in Practice
Understanding Trump-era diplomacy through ancient texts allows practitioners to refine their strategies:
· Focus on interest over ideology.
· Build regional alliances independently of global frameworks.
· Employ layered strategies (Sama-Dana-Bheda-Danda) in negotiations.
Diplomatic practice in this world must draw on Kautilyan realism, combining intelligence, deception, and resilience rather than idealism (Kautilya, 1992).
7. Modern Garrison States / Proxy Instruments (c. 2000–2025)
The concept of "garrison states"—smaller, often aid-dependent or strategically located nations used by major powers as proxies, forward bases, or buffers—is highly relevant in the context of both modern geopolitics and ancient statecraft (Kautilya, 1992).
Below is a breakdown of which countries have been “used” as garrison or proxy states by major powers like the USA, Russia, and China—specifically to disrupt peace or shape outcomes in other regions.
Table 1.0: Garrison States and their Geopolitical use(misuse)
The dynamics outlined above reflect a modern replay of ancient statecraft. As seen in the Arthaśāstra and Nitisara, many smaller nations today function as Udasina (neutral but vulnerable) or Yuddhaśheel (war-prone) states—drawn into conflicts not of their choosing and transformed into Yuddha-mandalas (war fronts) by larger powers (Kautilya, 1992)(Kamandaka as cited in Mehta, 2002). This mirrors Kautilya’s mandala theory, where empires expand influence through concentric rings, destabilising enemies (ari) via proxies rather than open war (Kautilya, 1992).
Conclusion: A Kautilyan World Order?
The Trump 2025 paradigm has not created chaos but revealed the fragility of an international system built on normative liberalism (Nye, 2020). What is emerging is a return to strategic autonomy, balance-of-power politics, and transactional diplomacy. Far from being a new phenomenon, this closely resembles the world order described by Hindu political thinkers millennia ago (Doniger, W., & Smith, B. K., 1991).
Garrisoning weaker states—through bases, aid, or ideology—is a timeless strategy of indirect domination (Kautilya, 1992). Under Trump’s transactional approach, U.S. support for some proxies waned (e.g., Pakistan shifted toward China), while China and Russia have embraced Cold War-era tactics, forging new mandalas through infrastructure control, military positioning, and strategic alliances (Nye, 2020).
In this new mandala, global actors must learn from ancient wisdom: a state that fails to prioritise its sovereignty and strategic interests’ risks becoming prey in the law of fishes (Manusmriti, Wendy D. and Brian K., 2005). Diplomacy in this context is not about building utopias but managing an anarchic world with sagacity and ruthlessness.
Key Shifts "After 2025"
Traditional allies (EU, Japan) move from Mitra to Udasina or even Ari-Mitra due to growing friction over trade, defense, and climate (Kautilya, 1992).
Transactional alignments (Israel, Saudi Arabia) rise, resembling Kamandaka’s flexible Mitra model—based purely on interest, not ideology (Kamandaka as cited in Mehta, 2002).
Turkey, Brazil exemplify Madhyama—middle powers playing both sides (Kautilya, 1992).
China and Russia become clear Vijigishu—aggressors filling the vacuum left by U.S. retreat.
U.S. under Trump increasingly abandons the “protector” role and behaves like a Matsya (predator)—relying on coercive tools rather than alliances.
India in 2025 stands as a textbook example of a Madhyama state evolving into a hard-power balancer, as envisioned in the Arthaśāstra. Once navigating great power rivalries through strategic autonomy, India has now begun actively shaping the regional order—no longer just balancing but asserting. Operation Sindoor, a landmark show of military resolve in 2025, marked India’s transition from a restrained middle power to a proactive strategic actor capable of cross-border precision operations. This reflects the Madhyama archetype not merely as a mediator but as a pivotal force—able to engage, deter, and influence outcomes across both eastern and western mandalas. India’s growing naval power in the Indo-Pacific, assertive diplomacy in West Asia, and calibrated response to China’s encroachments signal a civilizational state stepping decisively into hard-power geopolitics, guided by its own Rajdharma rather than alliance dependency.
References
Doniger, W., & Smith, B. K. (1991). The Laws of Manu. Penguin Classics.
Kamandaka as cited in Mehta. (2002). The anxiety of freedom: Imagination and political theory in India. Oxford University Press.
Kautilya, S. R. (1992). Kautilya's Arthashastra. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.
Mahabharata, John D. Smith. (2004). Mahabharata. Penguin Classics.
Manusmriti, Wendy D. and Brian K. (2005). The Laws of Manu (trans. Wendy Doniger and Brian K. Smith). . Penguin Books.
Nye, J. (2020). Do Morals Matter? Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump. Oxford University Press.
Great effort classmate.