The Militarization of Outer Space and the Structural Limits of Multilateralism (UNOOSA)

From Cooperation to Contestation, The Future of Multilateralism

Executive Summary

Multilateral institutions are increasingly criticized for their inability to address rapidly evolving global security challenges. One of the most revealing cases of this crisis is the militarization of outer space. Anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons testing, the institutionalization of military space commands, and the rapid expansion of commercial mega-constellations have transformed outer space from a cooperative scientific domain into a strategically contested environment.

Despite this transformation, space governance remains anchored in Cold War–era legal frameworks, particularly the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (United Nations, 1967), and is administered through the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA).

Figure 1.0 - Institutional hierarchy of multilateral space governance

As illustrated in Figure 1.0, UNOOSA operates within a hierarchy led by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), functioning primarily as a secretariat body without independent regulatory or enforcement authority.

This paper argues that the limitations of space multilateralism are not merely institutional weaknesses but structural consequences of the security dilemma. In a domain characterized by dual-use technologies, unverifiable intentions, and offense-dominant vulnerability, states are unwilling to cede sovereignty or accept intrusive enforcement mechanisms. Consequently, consensus-based multilateral frameworks lack the verification and compliance tools necessary to regulate military competition in space. Through a theoretically grounded analysis, this study demonstrates that the militarization of outer space exposes the structural limits of multilateralism in high-security domains and suggests incremental, realistic pathways for governance reform.

Introduction

Multilateralism has traditionally been regarded as a cornerstone of global governance, enabling states to coordinate collective responses to shared challenges. Yet growing geopolitical rivalry and technological acceleration have placed strain on existing institutional frameworks. Scholars increasingly argue that contemporary multilateral institutions are experiencing a crisis of effectiveness (Ikenberry, 2018).

Outer space represents one of the clearest manifestations of this crisis. Once framed as a global commons reserved for peaceful purposes, it has become increasingly militarized. Destructive ASAT tests by China (2007), India (2019), and Russia (2021) generated thousands of pieces of orbital debris, threatening global space infrastructure (Weeden & Samson, 2021). Concurrently, commercial actors such as SpaceX have deployed thousands of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites with both civilian and military utility.

The institutional architecture governing this domain, however, remains largely unchanged. The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), operating under the authority of COPUOS and the Outer Space Treaty, lacks enforcement authority, inspection capacity, and binding compliance mechanisms.

Theoretical Framework: The Security Dilemma in Outer Space

The security dilemma, first articulated by Herz (1950) and further developed by Jervis (1978) (Herz, 1950; Jervis, 1978), describes a structural condition of international anarchy in which measures taken by one state to enhance its security decrease the security of others, triggering competitive escalation.

Outer space exhibits three characteristics that intensify security dilemma dynamics.

First, space technologies are inherently dual-use. Satellites supporting weather monitoring and telecommunications also enable military command, intelligence, and precision targeting (Harrison, T., Johnson, K., & Roberts, T. G. , 2022). Defensive capabilities for one state may appear offensive to another.

Second, intentions in space are difficult to verify. Unlike terrestrial weapon systems, space-based capabilities lack clear visual indicators of function. This ambiguity fuels mistrust.

Third, the offense–defense balance appears skewed toward offense. Satellites are highly vulnerable to kinetic and non-kinetic disruption, while defending distributed constellations is costly and technologically uncertain (Johnson-Freese, 2017).

Under these conditions, states resist intrusive verification and binding constraints. The security dilemma thus provides a theoretical explanation for why robust multilateral regulation in space remains politically difficult.

Institutional Architecture of Space Governance

The Outer Space Treaty Framework

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit but does not ban conventional weapons or ASAT testing (United Nations, 1967). Drafted during the Cold War, it reflects a compromise between superpowers seeking to prevent nuclear escalation while preserving strategic flexibility.

The Role of UNOOSA

UNOOSA functions as the secretariat to COPUOS, facilitating international cooperation and maintaining voluntary transparency mechanisms such as the UN Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space.

However, as illustrated in Figure 1.0, UNOOSA:

• Possesses no enforcement authority

• Conducts no inspections

• Imposes no sanctions

• Relies on consensus decision-making

This design reflects sovereignty preservation rather than supranational regulation.

Militarization Trends and Governance Failures

Anti-Satellite Weapons and Orbital Debris

ASAT testing demonstrates the limits of existing governance. China’s 2007 test created over 3,000 trackable debris fragments, significantly increasing long-term orbital congestion (Weeden & Samson, 2021). Russia’s 2021 test produced approximately 1,500 additional fragments.

Table 1.0 summarizes major ASAT events and their strategic implications.

These incidents highlight a normative gap: no binding prohibition exists against debris-generating ASAT tests. UNOOSA lacks authority to investigate or sanction such actions.

Country	Year	Type of ASAT Test	Estimated Debris Created	Strategic Significance
China	2007	Direct-ascent kinetic ASAT (FY-1C satellite destruction)	~3,000+ trackable debris fragments	First major debris-generating ASAT test of the 21st century; significantly increased long-term orbital debris risk
India	2019	Direct-ascent kinetic ASAT (Mission Shakti)	~400 trackable fragments (majority decayed quickly)	Demonstrated counter-space capability; signalled entry into space deterrence competition
Russia	2021	Direct-ascent kinetic ASAT (Cosmos 1408 destruction)	~1,500+ trackable debris fragments	Raised global safety concerns; forced ISS crew precautionary shelter measures
United States	2008	Intercept of USA-193 satellite (Operation Burnt Frost)	Limited long-lived debris (low-altitude intercept)	Demonstrated ASAT capability; justified as safety operation but strategic signaling evident
United States / China / Russia	Ongoing (2015–present)	Development of non-kinetic counter-space capabilities (cyber, electronic warfare, co-orbital systems)	Minimal physical debris (non-kinetic)	Expands space warfare beyond kinetic destruction; increases ambiguity and mistrust

Table 1.0 - Selected ASAT Tests and Militarization Indicators in Outer Space

Sources: Weeden & Samson (2021); Harrison et al. (2022); Secure World Foundation (2022).

Institutionalization of Military Space Commands

The creation of dedicated military space forces signals the normalization of space as a warfighting domain. The United States established the United States Space Force in 2019. China reorganized its People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force in 2015 and again in 2024. Russia consolidated space functions within the Aerospace Forces (Harrison, T., Johnson, K., & Roberts, T. G. , 2022).

Table 2.0 illustrates this clustering of institutional reforms between 2015 and 2024. Rather than cooperative governance, major powers have embedded space within formal military hierarchies. This institutionalization deepens the security dilemma by signaling long-term strategic commitment to counter-space capabilities.

Country	Military Space Organization	Year Established / Reorganized	Institutional Structure	Strategic Significance
United States	United States Space Force (USSF)	2019	Independent military branch under Department of the Air Force	Formal recognition of space as a distinct warfighting domain; integrates space into joint military operations
China	People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (SSF); Aerospace Force restructuring	2015 (SSF); 2024 restructuring	Integrated space, cyber, and electronic warfare under centralized command	Signals integrated counter-space and informationized warfare doctrine
Russia	Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS)	2015	Merger of air force and space defense forces	Consolidates missile defense, early warning, and counter-space operations
India	Defence Space Agency (DSA)	2019	Tri-service military space agency under Integrated Defence Staff	Post-ASAT institutional expansion; formalizes space deterrence posture
France	French Space Command (Commandement de l’Espace, CDE)	2019	Dedicated military command within French Air and Space Force	European acknowledgment of space as strategic military domain
United Kingdom	UK Space Command	2021	Joint command under Ministry of Defence	Integrates civil-military space policy with national security strategy

Table 2.0 - Clustering of institutional reforms between 2015 and 2024

UNOOSA has no capacity to investigate or sanction such actions. This normative gap reveals the limits of existing governance structures.

Commercial Mega-Constellations

Commercialization further complicates governance. Starlink alone has deployed thousands of satellites and received authorization for further expansion. During the Ukraine conflict, commercial satellite communications demonstrated clear military utility (Harrison, T., Johnson, K., & Roberts, T. G. , 2022).

Operator / Program	Country	Approx. Satellites in Orbit (2025–26)	Dual-Use / Security Relevance
SpaceX – Starlink	USA	~9,350+ operational satellites in orbit (as of late 2025)	Civilian broadband with known strategic utility (used in conflict communications; significant contributor to orbital crowding)
SpaceX (FCC approval)	USA	Authorized deployment up to ~15,000 satellites	Massive expansion authorization with potential strategic applications (direct-to-cell mobile network, global coverage)
China SatNet (Guowang)	China	Planned: ~12,992–~13,000 satellites (planned filings)	State-linked broadband constellation; potential dual-use/strategic communications and spectrum competition
Shanghai SpaceSail / Qianfan	China	Thousands planned (reported filings; in early deployments)	Broadband with dual-use potential; competing LEO telecom infrastructure
China Mobile LEO proposals	China	~2,664 planned satellites	Telecom operator ambitions; potential strategic connectivity role
Amazon – Project Kuiper	USA	~3,236 planned satellites	Dual-use potential as broadband backbone with future strategic applications
OneWeb	UK / Global	~648 operational satellites	Broadband infrastructure with strategic partnerships possible

Table 3.0 - Growth of Commercial Mega-Constellations with Dual-Use Potential

Figure 2.0 below shows the scale of commercial and state-linked mega-constellations. The fusion of civilian and military functions blurs legal distinctions under the Outer Space Treaty and increases escalation risks.

Figure 2.0 - Growth of commercial low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite deployments (Starlink proxy data) compared with major debris-generating ASAT events, 2021–2025.

UNOOSA’s state-centric framework lacks mechanisms to regulate private actors effectively. While states retain responsibility for national space activities, enforcement remains domestically controlled and inconsistent.

Discussion: Structural Limits of Multilateralism in High-Security Domains

The shortcomings of space multilateralism are not simply institutional failures but structural consequences of the security dilemma in a high-security domain. Outer space sits at the intersection of nuclear deterrence, military power projection, and critical economic infrastructure. Under such conditions, states prioritize strategic autonomy over collective constraint. Multilateral weakness is therefore systemic, not accidental.

Sovereignty and Strategic Centrality

Space capabilities underpin nuclear early warning, intelligence, missile guidance, and command-and-control systems. Disruption of satellites could degrade second-strike credibility and destabilize deterrence (Harrison, T., Johnson, K., & Roberts, T. G. , 2022). Because space assets are embedded in national survival architectures, states resist intrusive verification comparable to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Unlike nuclear warheads, satellites are dual-use and technologically complex. Inspection regimes requiring disclosure of payloads, maneuver capabilities, or sensor specifications would expose strategic vulnerabilities. In security dilemma terms, transparency may reduce uncertainty but increase perceived vulnerability (Jervis, 1978). The limited authority of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) thus reflects sovereignty protection rather than bureaucratic inadequacy.

Consensus as Structural Veto

The consensus rule within the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) further entrenches paralysis. Designed to preserve universal participation during the Cold War, consensus now functions as a de facto veto for major powers. Binding proposals on debris-generating anti-satellite (ASAT) tests have stalled despite widespread rhetorical support for responsible behavior (United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], 2022).

Security dilemma dynamics intensify this impasse. Transparency or constraint proposals are often interpreted as asymmetric attempts to limit rivals while preserving national advantages. Reform initiatives themselves become securitized. Institutional design therefore mirrors strategic mistrust rather than mitigating it.

Fragmentation as Adaptive Governance

Regime fragmentation—such as the U.S.-led Artemis Accords—should not be viewed solely as multilateral decline. It represents adaptive governance under conditions of mistrust. Cooperation among like-minded states allows norm development without adversarial consent (Johnson-Freese, 2017). Universal consensus may be unrealistic in high-security domains.

However, fragmentation risks institutionalizing competing blocs. Parallel governance initiatives by China and Russia could produce normative bifurcation, reinforcing geopolitical division rather than convergence. This reflects broader regime complexity in global governance (Alter & Raustiala , 2018).

Offense Dominance and Deterrence Logic

The offense–defense balance in space further constrains reform. Satellites are highly vulnerable, while defending constellations is costly and technically uncertain (Harrison, T., Johnson, K., & Roberts, T. G. , 2022). This structural offense dominance incentivizes retention of counter-space capabilities as deterrence tools.

Under such conditions, states are reluctant to relinquish ASAT options or accept binding prohibitions. Multilateral constraint is least effective in domains where vulnerability encourages hedging. Institutional weakness thus stems from rational strategic calculation rather than normative failure.

The Civilian–Military Fusion Problem

Commercial mega-constellations intensify the security dilemma. Systems such as Starlink provide civilian broadband yet also support military communications in conflict environments (Harrison, T., Johnson, K., & Roberts, T. G. , 2022). The fusion of civilian infrastructure with military utility blurs legal categories under the Outer Space Treaty.

Regulating commercial actors multilaterally would require states to permit oversight of domestic industries—an unlikely concession in a sovereignty-sensitive domain. Moreover, adversaries may perceive dual-use satellites as legitimate targets, expanding escalation risks. Commercialization therefore magnifies ambiguity while reducing regulatory clarity.

Systemic Constraint, Not Institutional Failure

Taken together, sovereignty protection, consensus veto structures, offense dominance, and commercialization reveal a structural constraint on universal multilateralism in space. Institutions such as UNOOSA reflect the boundaries of what states are willing to concede in domains tied to strategic survival.

The crisis of space multilateralism is therefore systemic. In high-security environments characterized by dual-use ambiguity and strategic competition, binding governance mechanisms are politically and strategically costly. Effective reform may depend less on institutional redesign and more on gradual confidence-building measures that reduce mistrust without demanding extensive sovereignty concessions.

Recommendations for More Effective Governance

Recognizing structural constraints, reforms must be incremental and realistic.

1. Norm Development Against Debris-Generating ASAT Tests

Recent UN General Assembly resolutions discouraging destructive ASAT testing provide a foundation for norm-building. Transforming these voluntary commitments into widely accepted customary norms could reduce escalation risks.

2. Enhanced Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures

Voluntary data-sharing on satellite launches, maneuvers, and potential collisions could mitigate misperceptions. Expanding the UN Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space to include operational transparency would strengthen accountability.

3. Space Traffic Management Mechanisms

Developing multilateral space traffic coordination frameworks could reduce accidental collisions and enhance cooperative monitoring. While full enforcement may be unrealistic, standardized reporting could increase predictability.

4. Public-Private Governance Integration

States should coordinate through UNOOSA to develop reporting standards for commercial operators. Public-private partnerships could enhance resilience and clarify responsibilities.

These measures acknowledge the persistence of the security dilemma while seeking to reduce its destabilizing effects.

Conclusion

The militarization of outer space presents a revealing case of the structural limits of multilateralism. UNOOSA, operating under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, lacks enforcement and verification mechanisms necessary to regulate intensifying strategic competition.

Yet this institutional weakness reflects deeper structural dynamics. Security dilemma conditions—dual-use ambiguity, offense dominance, and strategic mistrust—constrain states’ willingness to accept binding constraints.

Space governance therefore illustrates a broader lesson: in high-security domains, multilateralism faces inherent structural limits. Effective reform will likely depend not on sweeping institutional redesign but on incremental norm development and confidence-building measures that gradually reduce mistrust.

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