2nd Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Use of Narrative Building, Disinformation, and Misinformation as a Critical Tool in Contemporary Warfare

“Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions” - Carl von Clausewitz

Introduction

Most conflicts in today’s age are not waged by militaries; in recent years, a particular kind of weaponry—"fake news" and digital disinformation—has taken centre stage in policy talks, public debates, and scholarly assessments (Horowitz, 2019). Although the technological age has changed society positively by facilitating digital communication, it has also given politically motivated actors the ability to employ mass influence to achieve their goals (Dowse & Bachmann, 2022). Alternate relatives have been produced in this day of information and digitisation, leading people to believe in false reality. The dramatic, exciting, and emotive content produced by contemporary media instruments undermines democratic norms and societal cohesiveness (Kakar & Niaz 2023). Parties in conflict have long used influence over media coverage and information flow to accomplish a variety of objectives, including influencing public opinion, demoralising opponent morale, vilifying the adversary, and preserving the spirits of their populace (Gillich, 2024). In contemporary warfare, effective use of the strength of information is one strategy that leads to battle victory (Babayeva, 2024).

One such recent and prevalent case is when combating Armenia's disinformation efforts was one of the most effective strategies that helped Azerbaijan win the 2^nd Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020.  Hence, this essay by analysing current scholarly literature, aims to take the example of Nagorno-Karabakh to analyse how significantly information warfare affects the states in reaching their desires result in contemporary warfare. By providing specific instance from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, This essay makes the argument that deception and information warfare are effective strategies that affect the results of contemporary conflicts and global perception.

Theoretical Underpinnings for Nagorno-Karabakh

The scope of the war's resurgence in Nagorno-Karabakh on September 27, 2020, which lasted until November 10, 2022, was a major surprise. After over 24 years of low-intensity violent frictions between the two parties, the frozen conflict—which had been in place since 1994, erupted into a full-scale war between Azerbaijan and the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh (Kofman, 2020). When the Republic of Azerbaijan freed Karabakh and seven neighbouring areas that had been under Armenian occupation for roughly 30 years, they used mass media to their advantage, thwarting attempts by the enemy to win over the international community with false information, and worked hard to ensure that the public had access to convincing narrative (Babayeva, 2024). It is important to understand that although the word "disinformation" was coined in the latter second half of the 20th century from the word "dezinformatsiya," which was linked to Soviet propaganda campaigns, it gained more attention in the latter part of the 21st century (Freelon & Wells, 2020). Disinformation poses a serious threat to both national and international security ecosystem when it is employed as a purposeful tactic with political motivations.  It is a crucial instrument in the growing danger of "grey zone" operations carried out by nation states in the line of combat (Dowse & Bachmann, 2022, 2).

Information empowers, consequently, misinformation and disinformation are its two forms

(Jha, 2024, 586). Although deception is weaponised, its impact is time-sensitive and depends on the receiver's perceived, hypothetical, or actual power, in contrast to kinetic weaponry that indiscriminately destroy every organism inside their "Mean effectiveness area” (Jha, 2024, 586). Often, the phrases "misinformation," "disinformation," and "propaganda" are used interchangeably, with definitions that change and overlap. Whether through online messages, advertising, written articles, or elite communication, all three deal with incorrect or misleading messages that are disseminated under the pretence of being informative (Guess, & Lyons, 2020). For the intent of this essay, disinformation is defined as a statement that deviates from or contradicts accepted notions of verifiable facts. The author would also like to point out that similar to "traditional" combat and warfare, communication weapons are also chaotic, with no one cause for the disarray or area where conflicts are fought. But, because there is a lack of reliable information during emergencies, online spaces are more susceptible to manipulation (Reuter, Lee Hughes, et al., 2024).

During military confrontations, disinformation can have a variety of complex effects, including detrimental ones and, in certain cases, potentially positive ones, though the latter is very contentious (Jha, 2024). First of all, misinforming citizens about safe areas or the locations of dangers might result in physical harm. Second, fake news has the power to exacerbate societal differences, promote hatred, and provoke violence. Furthermore, disinformation has the power to influence combatant behaviour, resulting in needless bloodshed, violations of the rules governing wartime conduct, and harm to civilian populations—all of which are against international humanitarian law. Additionally, pervasive misinformation undermines confidence in authorities, the media, and the truth itself, making peace talks and post-conflict reconciliation procedures more difficult (Jha, 2024).

Instances from 2nd Karabakh conflict

Covered in the mystique of inevitability and after 30 years of Russian assistance, the Armenian army was forced to surrender when the Azerbaijani army launched an invasion in just 44 days using cutting-edge weaponry and tactical tactics. Armenia had two primary ways to stop the impending defeat, which was evidently imminent.  One was to use strong artillery and missiles to target cities outside the war zone, with a focus on civilians. The other was to use Armenian lobbying groups to launch an “information war” and “disseminate false information” in an effort to increase global sanctions on Azerbaijan and secure a ceasefire (Babayeva, 2024, 263).

Rostomyan (2023) provides an extensive account on how the deliberate use of multimedia content—pictures and videos—that arouse strong emotions is one of the key disinformation tactics. For instance, The Azerbaijani Telegram, also known channel CBC TV Azerbaijan, which focused on Azerbaijan's reaction to the Armenian provocations in its reporting on the crisis, is one particular example. As an illustration, CBC TV Azerbaijan provided the following quote which dates November 10, 2020: “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan called the aggression of the Armenian side against Azerbaijan a gross violation of the fundamental norms and principles of international law”(Rosttomyan, 2023, 16). By doing this, Baku blamed Armenia's military-political leaders for all of the threats, conflicts, and casualties in the public’s eye. Same narrative building was used by Armenians as well. To elicit strong feelings and highlight Azerbaijani violence, the Armenian side's Telegram account “Armenian Life” often posted graphic images and videos of damaged civilian property, injured civilians, burning homes, ambulance cars that had been bombarded, and people in shelters along with descriptions emphasising the pain caused by Azerbaijani forces. Some have characterised Azerbaijan's counterattacks to free its captured areas as Muslim Turks attacking Christian Armenians on their own (Babayeva, 2024). Creating the perception of "dictatorial, demonic Muslim Turk" and "heavenly and persecuted Christian Armenian" in the eyes of the world was the goal of such dark propaganda and disinformation (Babayeva, 2024).

Often, similar to actual proxy wars, international media jumps in, which is seen in this conflict as well. Babayeva (2024) sheds light on a piece titled "Military advisors, mercenaries, and weapons: Erdogan and Putin's proxy exchange" appeared in the Italian newspaper “La Stampa” the day after the war began. It claimed that "Moscow is sending air defence systems and arms to the Armenians, while Türkiye is helping Baku with drones and soldiers’ (Babayeva, 2024, 263).  Similarly, in another international media, in an article titled "Nagorno-Karabakh: Turkey stokes the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia," the pro-Armenian French newspaper "Le Monde" said in its October 16 issue that "The control of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region heightened the previous day when Yerevan stated that a Turkish F-16 fighter jet shot down an Armenian "Su-25" aircraft in Armenian airspace” (Babayeva, 2024, 263).

However, it is imperative to note that such tactics are dependent on the availability and use of internet and social media, and more often than not, it creates confusion among ordinary minds, which is maybe the actual purpose of it. On the one hand, social media spread old narratives, but on the other, it helped new, incredibly simplistic narratives take root by superimposing them over "ancient" ones (Gillich, 2024). These narratives were the Armenian one of victimisation and Western betrayal, and the dominant Azerbaijani narrative of defending itself against aggression. Furthermore, people who want to sabotage a purported peace process propagate bogus sensationalist allegations and conspiracy theories on social media like wildfire, with the help of prominent journalists and public intellectuals who reposted them. Memes and short films on platforms like Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, and Telegram are examples of short, readily assimilated, and emotionally impactful content that has specifically targeted young people (Gillich, 2024).  

One key aspect of narrative building was seen when the government of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan declared martial law at the start of the 2^nd Karabakh War, which permits limitations on media freedom. Given the involvement of the general public and the non-state actors involved, allowing the free flow of information goes against a nation's national interests, making the independence of media a controversial matter in and of itself (Kakar & Niaz, 2023, 59). Hundreds of articles were forcibly removed, and news organisations were fined, after a temporary government decree in Armenia forbade the publication of material “criticizing” or “questioning the effectiveness” of governmental operations regarding the conflict. The social media app TikTok and websites with Turkish and Azerbaijani domain names were also prohibited by authorities. The present martial law in Armenia gives authorities the authority to, among other things, seize equipment from media outlets and create unique accreditation processes for journalists. In Azerbaijan, President Aliyev enacted a new media law in February 2022 that requires internet publications to file paperwork with the government and get authorisation before publishing news stories.

Conclusion

To conclude, the author of this paper can ascertain narrative building, disinformation, and misinformation are strategies that have several functions, including undermining faith in competing accounts, influencing how the conflict is viewed both domestically and internationally, and inspiring action that supports the goals of each side.  It can be termed as a  psychological warfare method employed by foreign powers seeking to sway the political landscape of another nation with fake news, which propagates (false) information to favour one's own position, cause, or candidacy against that of others (Guadagno & Guttieri, 2021).

Directing communication over conventional kinetic operations is becoming increasingly important in modern warfare, as demonstrated by the use of disinformation and purposeful narrative fabrication (Rostomyan, 2023).  The Nagorno-Karabakh war serves as an significant example of how narrative construction, misinformation, and disinformation by using relevant social media channels are strategically important tactics in modern conflicts that impact both international legitimacy perceptions and for a matter of fact, actual outcomes. For future references and studies, studies could be based on how  armies should be able to conduct operations in the twenty-first century that consider information technology, current and intelligent equipment, future fighting systems, and the full use of IT assistance and data (Araźna, 2015). Furthermore, how can disinformation should be tackled should be a priority of nation-states in this 21^st technologically driven century. 

References

1.     Araźna, M. (2015). Conflicts of the 21st century based on multidimensional warfare–“hybrid warfare”, disinformation and manipulation. Security and defence quarterly, 8(3), 103-129.

2.     Babayeva, G. Z. (2024). WAR AND INFORMATION WARFARE: ANALYSIS ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE SECOND KARABAKH WAR. Baltic Journal of Legal and Social Sciences, (4), 262-267.

3.     Dowse, A., & Bachmann, S. D. (2022). Information warfare: methods to counter disinformation. Defense & Security Analysis, 38(4), 453-469.

4.     Freelon, D., & Wells, C. (2020). Disinformation as political communication. Political communication, 37(2), 145-156.

5.     Gillich, I. (2024). Media coverage and state propaganda in armed conflicts-An international law perspective at the Armenia-Azerbaijan" Propaganda War. Journal of International Media & Entertainment Law, 10(2).

6.     Guadagno, R. E., & Guttieri, K. (2021). Fake news and information warfare: An examination of the political and psychological processes from the digital sphere to the real world. In Research anthology on fake news, political warfare, and combatting the spread of misinformation (pp. 218-242). IGI Global Scientific Publishing.

7.     Guess, A. M., & Lyons, B. A. (2020). Misinformation, disinformation, and online propaganda. Social media and democracy: The state of the field, prospects for reform, 10, 10-33.

8.     Horowitz, M. A. (2019). Disinformation as warfare in the digital age: dimensions, dilemmas, and solutions. Journal of Vincentian Social Action, 4(2), 5.

9.     Kakar, N. U. A., & Niaz, B. (2023). Media and hybrid war: Political influence and disinformation. Journal of Education And Humanities Research (JEHR), University of Balochistan, Quetta, 15(1), 57-64.

10.  Kofman, M. (2020). Armenia–Azerbaijan War: Military Dimensions of the Conflict. Russia Matters, October, 2.

11.  Reuter, C., Lee Hughes, A., & Buntain, C. (2024). Combating information warfare: state and trends in user-centred countermeasures against fake news and misinformation. Behaviour & Information Technology, 1-14.

12.  Rostomyan, M. (2023). From Mountains to Social Media Valleys: A Thematic Analysis of Information Warfare through Telegram Data in the Nagorno-Karabakh War. The Journal of Intelligence, Conflict, and Warfare, 6(2), 1-25.