Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Policy in 2026: Needs, Strategies, Gaps and Reforms

Introduction — Objective and significance

This paper examines Australia’s contemporary counter-terrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE) framework, centred on A Safer Australia: Australia’s Counter-Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy 2025 (“the Strategy”), and evaluates its effectiveness against a security environment that has evolved significantly since the Strategy was released. Australia continues to experience elevated antisemitism and broader religious and inter-communal tensions, online radicalisation, mass mobilisation around international and domestic political issues, foreign-state interference and increasingly young individuals entering violent-extremism pathways. These concerns acquired even greater urgency following the antisemitic terrorist attack at Bondi Beach on 14 December 2025, which subsequently led to the establishment of the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion in January 2026 (Australian Government, National Security, 2025; Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion, 2026a).

The paper has three objectives: first, to analyse why Australia requires a comprehensive CT/CVE policy; second, to explain the principal legislative, preventive and operational strategies used to counter terrorism and the rationale underpinning them; and third, to evaluate where policy and implementation require modification to address contemporary radicalisation and terrorism more effectively. Australia is an important case internationally because it illustrates how a liberal democracy without an internal insurgency must respond to transnational terrorism, foreign interference and digitally accelerated extremism while preserving lawful political expression and civil liberties.

Australia’s national terrorism threat level remains PROBABLE, meaning there is a “greater than fifty per cent chance of an onshore attack or attack planning in the next twelve months” (Australian Government, National Security, 2026a). The level was raised from POSSIBLE on 5 August 2024 and has remained elevated through September 2026. The current government assessment identifies declining social cohesion, reduced trust in institutions and domestic actors increasingly motivated by combinations of socio-political and personal grievances.  The events of 2025–26 demonstrate that the risk is no longer adequately understood only through traditional terrorist organisations. The threat landscape now includes self-radicalised lone actors, online extremist networks, state-sponsored terrorism, prohibited hate groups and younger persons progressing rapidly toward violence.

Why Australia needs a comprehensive counter-terrorism policy

A. A dynamic, multi-vector threat environment

Elevated threat level

Australia’s terrorism threat level remains PROBABLE as at September 2026. The National Security website states that Australia has entered a vulnerable period in which social and political pressures, reduced social cohesion and intersecting personal grievances can contribute to mobilisation toward violence (Australian Government, National Security, 2026a).

The security environment has also become increasingly difficult to categorise neatly. Government assessments now distinguish religiously motivated violent extremism (RMVE), ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE), nationalist and racist extremism, anti-authority violence and issue-motivated extremism, while recognising that contemporary offenders may combine ideas from several ideological streams. The policy significance is that counter-terrorism must increasingly be behaviour- and threat-based rather than dependent on rigid ideological categories.

Incidents and indicators

The Wakeley church stabbing in April 2024 demonstrated the continuing possibility of rapid lone-actor mobilisation within a religiously motivated frame. In June 2025, Australia listed Terrorgram, a decentralised violent accelerationist network, as a terrorist organisation, demonstrating the adaptation of the listing regime to organisations whose operational centre is largely digital.

Foreign-state involvement subsequently became considerably more significant. In August 2025, the Australian Government attributed antisemitic arson attacks to Iranian direction. Parliament then enacted the Criminal Code Amendment (State Sponsors of Terrorism) Act 2025, establishing a new legal framework for terrorism conducted or supported by foreign state entities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was formally designated Australia’s first state sponsor of terrorism, effective 28 November 2025.

The most consequential development was the Bondi Beach terrorist attack of 14 December 2025 at a Jewish Hanukkah event. The attack resulted in the establishment of a federal Royal Commission examining, among other matters, radicalisation, antisemitism, information-sharing, counter-terrorism coordination, protective security and whether existing legal or regulatory frameworks impeded prevention or response.

Youth and online radicalisation

Evidence released during 2026 strengthens one of the central arguments of the 2025 Strategy: radicalisation is becoming younger and increasingly mediated through online environments. In March 2026, Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke stated that half of the current CVE caseload was under 24, 31% was under 18, and 8% involved children aged 10–14. By June 2026, the AFP had investigated 63 youth-radicalisation cases since 2020, with 33 individuals charged with state or Commonwealth offences.

The Government responded by establishing a Counter Terrorism Online Centre, backed by $74 million over two years, specifically to strengthen Australia’s capacity to identify and disrupt online radicalisation.  This is a major development and directly confirms that the online environment is now a central rather than peripheral CT/CVE concern.

Social cohesion and mass mobilisation

Large pro-Palestine, anti-immigration and counter-protest movements remain an important element of the Australian public-order environment. Peaceful assembly is not terrorism and should not be conflated with violent extremism. Nevertheless, large demonstrations can create environments in which fringe groups exploit polarisation, circulate extremist narratives or engage in intimidation and violence.

The policy challenge is therefore not to restrict legitimate protest but to distinguish lawful political mobilisation from incitement, hate crime, extremist recruitment and preparation for violence. This distinction became even more important after the Bondi attack and subsequent federal reforms addressing hate-motivated extremism.

B. Evidence of religious and inter-communal divides

Table 1 — Indicators of religious and inter-communal hostility

Category	Latest available evidence	Policy significance
Anti-Jewish incidents	ECAJ (Executive Council of Australian Jewry) recorded 2,062 incidents from Oct 2023–Sep 2024 and 1,654 incidents from Oct 2024–Sep 2025. Although the second period declined, it remained almost five times the pre-Oct-2023 annual average.	Sustained rather than temporary elevation; protective security and early-warning capacity remain necessary.
Anti-Muslim hostility	Islamophobia in Australia Report V recorded 309 verified in-person and 366 online incidents for Jan 2023–Nov 2024. By 2026, the Register reported continued substantial growth; Report VI, covering approximately Dec 2024–Sep 2026, is being commissioned.	Demonstrates reciprocal social-cohesion pressures and reinforces the need for consistent multi-faith hate-crime monitoring.
Anti-Hindu incidents	Temple vandalism and religiously targeted graffiti have been documented in Australia, including several incidents in 2023 and subsequent cases. However, Australia still lacks a standardised national Hindu-specific hate-incident time series comparable with the ECAJ series.	The absence of comparable national data is itself a measurement gap.

ECAJ’s (Executive Council of Australian Jewry) updated 2025 report is especially important. It recorded 1,654 anti-Jewish incidents between October 2024 and September 2025, compared with 2,062 in the preceding year; serious categories including vandalism and arson nevertheless remained elevated.

For anti-Muslim hostility, the latest completed national academic report remains Report V. A sixth report is now being prepared using data extending to September 2026. In September 2026, the Office of the Special Envoy to Combat Islamophobia also launched a National Islamophobia Index with the Scanlon Foundation Research Institute, creating a new longitudinal measurement mechanism.

The broader conclusion is that Australia’s security problem cannot be reduced to one religion or community. Mutually reinforcing religious hostility, overseas conflicts, online amplification and extremist opportunism can degrade social cohesion and create environments that violent actors exploit.

C. Major extremist entities and vectors in Australia

Religiously motivated violent extremism remains a core threat, including individuals inspired by Islamic State or al-Qaida. The Bondi attack reinforced the continued relevance of this stream; Islamic State subsequently claimed the attack and used it within its propaganda.  At the same time, nationalist, racist, neo-Nazi, accelerationist and anti-authority movements remain part of the security environment.

Australia’s legal architecture has broadened accordingly. Terrorgram remains listed under the terrorist-organisation regime, while the new prohibited hate group framework created in January 2026 has already been applied to Hizb ut-Tahrir and White Australia, effective 6 March and 16 May 2026 respectively. Membership, recruitment, training, financial support and other forms of participation in listed prohibited hate groups can now constitute Commonwealth offences.

Foreign-state interference has also moved from being primarily an intelligence concern into the explicit terrorism framework. The State Sponsors of Terrorism Act 2025 created offences for state terrorist acts, preparation, training, support and financing; the IRGC designation operationalised this regime.

Migration and humanitarian programs should continue to inform settlement-service planning, social-cohesion policy and security screening, but migration is not itself an extremist vector. The latest complete migration outcome, 2024–25, delivered 185,001 permanent places; India (48,326), China (20,405), the Philippines (10,972), the United Kingdom (10,205), Pakistan (9,557) and Sri Lanka (9,444) were among the largest citizenship groups.  The 2024–25 Humanitarian Program delivered 20,000 visas, including 15,999 offshore humanitarian visas and 4,001 permanent protection visas; 6,700 offshore grants went to Afghan nationals.

These figures create planning obligations rather than evidence of terrorism risk. Screening, integration, community partnerships, youth support and rapid responses to foreign-conflict spillovers are more defensible policy tools than treating nationality or religion as a proxy for extremism.

Figure 1: Immigration Intakes by Australia, Source: (AU Migration Program, n.d.)

Figure 2: Humanitarian Intakes by Country of origin, Source: (AU Humanitarian Program, n.d.) 

II. Strategies, laws and rationale

A. The Strategy: prevention-first, partnership-centred

The 2025 Strategy remains the overarching policy framework in 2026. It treats prevention as Australia’s first defence and emphasises community resilience, early identification, intervention and diversion, public preparedness, partnerships and disruption of violent-extremist material online.

Its rationale remains persuasive: terrorist violence is usually the end stage of a process in which grievances, social networks, ideological material and individual vulnerabilities converge. Intervening earlier can divert trajectories before criminal thresholds are reached and reduce reliance on late-stage coercive powers.

The 2026 youth data substantially reinforces this rationale. Radicalisation involving children as young as 10–14 is difficult to manage primarily through prosecution. The policy therefore requires law enforcement, education, health, families, technology companies and specialist CVE services to operate as an integrated prevention system.

Figure 3: Prevention First pathway in Australia's CT/CVE strategy 2026

B. Legislative underpinnings and developments to 2026

1. Criminal Code Part 5.3

Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 remains the foundation of Australian terrorism law. Division 102 regulates terrorist organisations and offences concerning membership, recruitment, training, support and financing. Preventative detention orders, control orders and post-sentence regimes provide additional risk-management mechanisms.

2. State Sponsors of Terrorism regime

The Criminal Code Amendment (State Sponsors of Terrorism) Act 2025 is one of the most important post-Strategy reforms. It allows foreign state entities to be designated where statutory criteria concerning terrorist acts targeted at Australia are satisfied and creates corresponding offences for participation, preparation, support and financing. The IRGC is currently the sole listed state sponsor.

3. Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism legislation

Following the Bondi attack, Parliament enacted two major laws on 21 January 2026:

• the Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism (Criminal and Migration Laws) Act 2026; and

• the Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism (Firearms and Customs Laws) Act 2026.

The first strengthened penalties for hate-motivated conduct, created aggravated offences relevant to preachers and leaders, introduced aggravated grooming provisions, expanded migration consequences, and established Part 5.3B—Prohibited Hate Groups.  The second strengthened firearms and customs controls.

The prohibited-hate-group regime has already resulted in listings of Hizb ut-Tahrir and White Australia, demonstrating an attempt to address organisations that may not meet the terrorism-listing threshold but engage in qualifying hate-related activity.

4. Counter-terrorism financing

The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 remains central to financial disruption. The legislation was further updated in 2026, including changes addressing high-risk financial mechanisms and the financing of state-sponsored terrorism.

5. Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill 2026

As at 30 September 2026, the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill 2026 has passed the House and is before the Senate. It proposes to extend control orders, preventative detention orders, post-sentence orders and terrorism-related search powers to 7 December 2029, strengthen control orders for serious terrorist offenders and modify the terrorist-organisation de-listing framework.

C. Implementation in practice

Example	What occurred	CT/CVE significance
Wakeley church attack — Apr 2024	Treated as a terrorist act, activating joint counter-terrorism arrangements.	Demonstrated rapid lone-actor RMVE mobilisation and the importance of post-incident community management.
Terrorgram listing — Jun 2025	Decentralised accelerationist network listed as a terrorist organisation.	Demonstrated adaptation from hierarchical terrorist organisations to digitally networked extremist ecosystems.
IRGC designation — Nov 2025	IRGC became Australia’s first state sponsor of terrorism.	Connected foreign-state-directed violence directly to the CT legal framework.
Bondi Beach attack — Dec 2025	Antisemitic terrorist attack triggered major security reviews and a Royal Commission.	Exposed the importance of protective security, information-sharing, radicalisation detection and operational coordination.
Prohibited hate groups — Mar/May 2026	Hizb ut-Tahrir and White Australia designated under the new framework.	Creates a middle regulatory category between lawful extremist speech and terrorist-organisation proscription.
Counter Terrorism Online Centre — May 2026	Government committed $74m over two years.	Direct response to younger, faster and digitally mediated radicalisation.
Royal Commission Interim Report — Apr 2026	Fourteen recommendations issued concerning CT coordination, JCTTs, preparedness and firearms.	Moves the policy debate from simply creating more offences toward implementation and institutional coordination.

The Royal Commission’s public interim recommendations are particularly significant. They call for consideration of a full-time Commonwealth Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, a clearer role for ANZCTC during crises, regular updating of the Counter-Terrorism Handbook, annual ANZCTC advice to National Cabinet, a review of Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams and stronger national firearms arrangements.

Figure 4: Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Policy and Threat Response Timeline, 2024–2026. Source: Author’s synthesis based on Australian Government National Security, Parliamentary Library, Department of Home Affairs, and Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion sources.

III. Reality vs Policy: Visual Gap Analysis

Australia still does not face the civil-war, territorial-control and governance-vacuum conditions that sustain terrorism in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan or Somalia. Its vulnerabilities are structurally different: self-radicalised lone actors, youth radicalisation, online extremist ecosystems, foreign interference, hate mobilisation and episodic mass-protest flashpoints.

The developments of 2025–26 make one important refinement to the original argument: Australia’s principal weakness is increasingly an implementation and coordination gap, not merely absence of legislation. The Commonwealth has added substantial new offences and powers since 2025. The question is whether agencies can identify risk quickly enough, share intelligence efficiently, intervene lawfully and protect vulnerable targets.

Figure 5 — Anti-Jews attacks in Australia, Source: (ECAJ, 2024)

The figure includes 1,654 incidents for Oct 2024–Sep 2025, following the preceding peak of 2,062. The decline does not represent a return to normality: ECAJ states that the 2025 level remained almost five times the pre-October-2023 average.

Policy implication: protective security and cohesion interventions require sustained rather than temporary surge capacity.

Figure 6 — Anti-Muslims attacks in Australia Source: (IRA Monash & Deakins, 2023-2024)

The existing Report V figure remains valid as the latest completed national academic dataset. Report VI is in preparation, covering approximately December 2024–September 2026, and a National Islamophobia Index was launched in September 2026.

Policy implication: comparable longitudinal measurement is improving but remains incomplete.

Figure 7 — Anti-Hindu attacks in Australia, Source: (Anti-Hindu Tracker, n.d.)

The existing Australia-only incident graphic can remain, but it should clearly state that it is derived from documented community-tracker cases rather than a comprehensive national police dataset.

Policy implication: Australia still lacks nationally standardised, religion-specific hate data across Jewish, Muslim, Hindu and other communities.

Figure 8 — Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Complaints in Australia, 2024–25

Year-to-year enforcement outcomes (25 → 16 → 9 → 13 → 10). This is not a direct radicalisation metric, but it tracks successful disruptions.

Policy implication: sustain investigative tempo while expanding pre-charge diversion options where lawful.

These figures are enforcement outcomes, not a direct measure of radicalisation.

Figure 9 — TVE-Terrorist Violent Extremism complaints in Australia 2024-2025, Source: (ESafety Commissioner TVE Complaints, 2024-2025)

In 2024–25, eSafety recorded:

• 636 complaints concerning violent extremist material, and

• 227 complaints concerning material advocating a terrorist act.

This compares with the older 2022–23 values of 190 and 48 respectively.

In July 2026, eSafety also commenced Federal Court civil-penalty proceedings against Telegram, alleging failures to remove pro-terror and other unlawful material.

Policy implication: the online-threat vector has intensified materially and is now supported by both complaint data and regulatory enforcement.

Figure 10 — Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Policy–Reality Gap Heatmap, 2026

Source: Analytical synthesis based on ECAJ (2025), Islamophobia Register Australia (2025–2026), Hinduphobia Tracker (n.d.), Australian Government migration and humanitarian program data, Australian Government National Security (2025–2026), Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion (2026), AFP, and eSafety Commissioner.

The heatmap indicates that Australia’s most persistent policy-delivery gaps in 2026 are concentrated in online moderation/disruption, protest management, governance/coordination and protective security, while migration-data use presents a comparatively lower gap. Prevention/CVE remains a medium-level concern because of the growing youth-radicalisation caseload, whereas the foreign-interference legal gap has narrowed following the introduction of the State Sponsors of Terrorism regime. Overall, the pattern suggests that Australia’s principal challenge is increasingly not the absence of legal powers, but the speed, consistency and coordination of implementation across agencies and jurisdictions.

IV. Where policy should be modified

A. Close the early-warning-to-early-help gap

The dramatic shift toward younger CVE cases means prevention capacity must be redesigned around schools, families, youth services, health systems and online environments. The fact that 31% of the CVE caseload is reportedly under 18 and 8% aged 10–14 makes a purely criminal-justice model inappropriate.

Australia should establish nationally consistent referral standards, privacy-controlled information sharing and specialist practitioners capable of managing minors exhibiting concerning behaviour without automatically criminalising them.

B. Convert the Counter Terrorism Online Centre into measurable capability

The 2026 establishment of the Counter Terrorism Online Centre partially answers the previous policy gap; the next challenge is effectiveness. Government should publish de-identified indicators such as referral volumes, response times, disruption outcomes and platform cooperation.

eSafety’s 2024–25 complaint figures and its litigation against Telegram demonstrate that online extremism is not merely a theoretical vulnerability.  The policy objective should therefore shift from “creating online capability” to measuring whether that capability reduces exposure, recruitment and mobilisation.

C. Strengthen operational coordination rather than continually defaulting to new offences

The Royal Commission’s interim recommendations provide the strongest evidence-based reform agenda currently available. Australia should prioritise its recommendations regarding the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Joint Counter-Terrorism Teams, ANZCTC crisis arrangements, updated operational handbooks and regular briefings to National Cabinet.

This matters because the 2026 experience indicates that legislation alone cannot guarantee prevention. Intelligence must reach the correct agency, operational responsibilities must be clear, and protective-security assessments must translate rapidly into action.

D. Operationalise the state-sponsored-terrorism framework

The new State Sponsors regime substantially closes the legal gap identified in the original paper concerning foreign-directed attacks. Future policy should concentrate on intelligence attribution, proxy networks, financial disruption and coordination between ASIO, AFP, DFAT and AUSTRAC rather than establishing another overlapping legal category.

E. Use migration and humanitarian data for targeted prevention, screening and settlement support

The Commonwealth now has stronger migration-law powers concerning hate-related conduct under the Combatting Antisemitism, Hate and Extremism (Criminal and Migration Laws) Act 2026.

Migration and humanitarian statistics should therefore be used intelligently: security and character screening where statutory criteria justify it, combined with settlement assistance, youth engagement, language support, employment pathways and community partnerships. Australia should avoid treating nationality or religion as a proxy for terrorism risk; such an approach is analytically weak and can undermine the community cooperation on which prevention depends.

F. Create a unified Social Cohesion Risk Dashboard

Australia still lacks a single consistent national system integrating:

• police-recorded prejudice-motivated offences;

• ECAJ anti-Jewish incident data;

• anti-Muslim incident indicators and the emerging National Islamophobia Index;

• comparable anti-Hindu and other religious-hate indicators;

• CVE referrals and intervention outcomes;

• protest-related arrests by offence category;

• online TVE complaints and regulatory actions; and

• terrorism-threat-level rationale.

Such a dashboard would allow policy to distinguish temporary political mobilisation from genuine escalation toward violence and would make funding decisions more evidence-based.

Figure 11 — Unified Social Cohesion Risk Dashboard (Illustrative Model). Values shown are illustrative only and do not represent an official Australian Government dataset.

This dashboard illustrates how multiple social-cohesion and CT/CVE indicators could be integrated into a single national monitoring framework. By combining hate-incident trends, CVE referrals, protest-related offences, online violent-extremist content and threat-level indicators, it would support more consistent identification of emerging risks, inter-agency coordination and evidence-based resource allocation.

G. Preserve proportionality and independent oversight

The Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill 2026 would extend coercive powers to 2029 and strengthen the control-order framework. Parliamentary scrutiny has raised concerns about repeated extension of broad powers and their effects on rights and liberties.

If enacted, these powers should therefore remain subject to independent review, judicial oversight and transparent reporting. An effective CT system requires both operational capability and legitimacy.

Conclusion

Australia’s counter-terrorism landscape in 2026 is materially different from the environment in which the 2025 Strategy was launched. The Bondi Beach attack, rapidly growing evidence of youth and online radicalisation, state-linked terrorism, persistent religious hostility and digitally networked extremist movements demonstrate that the Strategy correctly anticipated a fragmented and hybrid threat environment. At the same time, subsequent legislation has significantly expanded Australia’s toolkit: state sponsors of terrorism can now be designated, prohibited hate groups can be proscribed, migration and hate-crime provisions have been strengthened, and online counter-terrorism capability has received substantial new investment.

The central policy question has consequently shifted. Australia is no longer principally confronting an absence of legal powers; it is increasingly confronting an implementation problem. The Royal Commission’s interim findings point toward coordination, information sharing, protective security, JCTT effectiveness, crisis governance and operational readiness. The strongest next step is therefore to make existing powers and institutions work together more quickly and consistently rather than assume that each terrorist incident necessarily requires another layer of criminal law.

A second priority is measurement. Government should be able to demonstrate whether new investment is reducing radicalisation trajectories, improving platform compliance, shortening referral times and protecting high-risk events. Establishing comparable national social-cohesion and hate-crime indicators would also help distinguish ideological mobilisation from criminal intimidation and emerging violent-extremist risk. This is especially important where different communities report very different levels of data availability.

Finally, policy must retain proportionality. Australia’s comparative strength remains that it can counter terrorism without adopting the counter-insurgency architecture required in states experiencing civil war or territorial insurgency. A credible Australian model should therefore combine targeted intelligence, early intervention, digital disruption, strong inter-agency coordination, accountable coercive powers and community confidence. The objective is not simply to accumulate additional offences, but to ensure that Australia can identify an emerging threat earlier, intervene lawfully, protect likely targets and demonstrate that prevention measures are producing measurable results.

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