Climate change, security and intelligence analysis in Australia and the Pacific Islands

Kiribati, Tuvalu, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea

Introduction

Climate change is no longer just an environmental problem; it is a systemic risk multiplier that cuts across health, food systems, energy, migration and security. The United Nations estimates that around 3.2 billion people – roughly 40% of the global population – are already adversely affected by land degradation and related ecological decline, a trend closely intertwined with climate change and unsustainable land use (UN Environment Program, 2022).  At the same time, the World Health Organization projects that between 2030 and 2050, climate change will cause approximately 250,000 additional deaths per year from malnutrition, malaria, diarrhoea and heat stress (WHO, 2025).

Figure 1.0 – Australia and Pacific Islands

For intelligence analysts and risk assessors, these statistics are not abstract. They signal transformative pressures on state capacity, social stability and regional power balances. This essay assesses the climate crisis along three axes specified in the brief: (1) primary catalysts of the crisis, (2) the culpability of state actors, and (3) barriers to progress. It does so through a domestic lens centred on Australia and its immediate region, the Pacific Islands, and situates these findings within the broader international governance and security landscape. The essay concludes with a detailed proposal for how Australia and Pacific partners could integrate climate security into intelligence analysis, risk assessment and policy responses.

Figure 2.0 – Asia Pacific Defence Reporter

1. Primary catalysts of the climate crisis

1.1 Global drivers: fossil fuels, land use and systemic ecological stress

The primary catalyst of contemporary climate change is the rapid accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from fossil fuel combustion, land-use change and industrial processes. Atmospheric CO₂ concentrations reached a new record in 2024, about 423–424 ppm, more than 150% above pre-industrial levels, with the largest annual increase since measurements began (Live Science, 2025). This reflects continued dependence on coal, oil and gas, compounded by weakening natural carbon sinks such as oceans and forests.

Land-use practices further amplify the crisis. The UN Environment Programme and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification estimate that up to 40% of the world’s land is degraded, directly affecting billions of people and undermining climate resilience through soil erosion, biodiversity loss and reduced agricultural productivity (UN Environment Program, 2022). Food production alone drives much of this degradation and is a leading cause of habitat loss and emissions (UN Environment Program, 2022). These global ecological pressures are not evenly distributed; they disproportionately harm regions with limited adaptive capacity, including many Pacific Island countries.

1.2 Regional climate trends: Australia and Pacific Islands

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) finds with very high confidence that the Australasian region is already experiencing significant warming, sea-level rise and more frequent extremes. For Australia, observed trends include more hot days and heatwaves, increased fire weather in the south and east, and declining cool-season rainfall in the southeast and southwest (IPCC, 2022). These changes contributed to the conditions underlying the 2019–20 “Black Summer” bushfires, with attribution studies indicating that anthropogenic climate change made such extreme fire weather at least 30% more likely (World Weather Attribution, 2020).

Figure 3.0 – Bushfire 2020 | Source: World Weather Attribution

For small islands, including Pacific Island countries (PICs), the IPCC identifies sea-level rise, coastal flooding, erosion, coral bleaching and freshwater stress as core impact pathways (IPCC, 2022). Even a modest additional rise in sea level by around 5–10 cm in coming decades could dramatically increase the frequency of extreme coastal flooding events in many islands (IPCC, 2022). Recent assessments by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) show that sea level in parts of the Southwest Pacific is rising faster than the global average, while unprecedented marine heatwaves in 2024 affected vast areas of ocean around Australia and neighbouring states, damaging fisheries and coral reefs (Reuters, 2025).

These climatic shifts create cascading security risks: crop failure, damage to infrastructure, displacement from low-lying settlements and heightened demands for humanitarian assistance. For example, Fiji has already identified more than 40 villages for potential relocation, with several communities moving inland due to recurrent flooding and coastal erosion (Washington Post, 2025).

1.3 Australia’s fossil fuel economy as a regional catalyst

While Australia represents a small share of global population, it is a disproportionately large contributor to GHG emissions. Historical analyses suggest that Australia’s cumulative emissions amount to around 1.5% of global totals, a significant figure given its relatively small population (Climate Change Tracker, 2025).

Indicator	Value / Finding	Source
Share of global population	~0.3% of global population	UN Population Division (2024)
Cumulative share of global GHG emissions	~1.5% of global historical emissions	Climate Change Tracker (2025)
Current per-capita emissions	Approximately double the OECD average	OECD Environmental Outlook (2024)
Australia's rank in OECD per-capita emissions	Among the highest per-capita emitters in the OECD	OECD Environmental Data (2024)
Share of global fossil CO₂ linked to Australian fuels (2022)	~4.5% of global fossil CO₂ emissions	OECD Energy & Emissions Report (2024)
Share of Australian fossil CO₂ footprint from exports	~80% generated by exported coal, oil, and gas, rather than domestic combustion	OECD Energy & Emissions Report (2024)
Regional impact	Export-driven emissions contribute to sea-level rise and climate-driven extreme events in Pacific Island states	UNEP Climate Vulnerability Synthesis (2023)

Table 1.0 – Australia’s Fossil-Fuel–Driven Climate Impact

In terms of current emissions, multiple assessments show that Australia is among the highest per-capita emitters in the OECD, with per-capita GHG emissions roughly double the OECD average and significantly higher than many other developed states (OECD, 2024).

Moreover, Australia’s global climate impact extends beyond its territorial emissions.

Australia’s continued expansion or maintenance of coal and gas production therefore functions as a regional catalyst, effectively outsourcing emissions that drive sea-level rise and extreme events in the Pacific Islands.

2. Culpability of state actors

2.1 Historical responsibility and major emitters

The distribution of responsibility for the climate crisis is highly unequal. Historical CO₂ emissions data show that the United States is responsible for almost one-quarter of cumulative CO₂ emissions, with other industrialised states such as China, Russia, Brazil and EU members also major contributors (Our World in Data, 2024). Pacific Island countries, by contrast, contribute only a tiny fraction of global emissions yet face existential risks.

Recent studies of “carbon majors” indicate that just a few dozen fossil fuel companies account for over half of global CO₂ emissions from produced fuels, underpinning calls for corporate accountability alongside state responsibility (The Guardian, 2025). This concentration of emissions underscores that culpability cannot be assessed purely at the national level; it is also embedded in transnational corporate structures, supply chains and financial systems.

2.2 Australia’s disproportionate role

From an intelligence and risk-assessment perspective, Australia occupies a dual position: it is both highly exposed to climate impacts and structurally implicated in driving them. Its per-capita emissions rank among the highest in the OECD and G20, largely due to coal-based electricity, energy-intensive industry and transport (OECD, 2024). Australia’s export-oriented fossil fuel sector further amplifies its global footprint (Climate Analytics Report, 2024).

Domestically, recent policy moves—such as legislating a 2030 target and adopting a 2035 emissions-reduction target of 62–70% below 2005 levels—signal a shift, but still fall short of the range recommended by the national Climate Change Authority (65–75%) (Reuters, 2025). Given Australia’s historical emissions, per-capita footprint and economic capacity, many analysts argue that it bears a higher level of responsibility to pursue more ambitious cuts and support vulnerable states (The Australian Institute, 2020).

2.3 Pacific Island countries: low emitters, high moral authority

Pacific Island countries, by contrast, are paradigmatic “victims” rather than drivers of climate change. Their emissions are negligible in global terms, yet they face threats to territorial integrity, food security and cultural survival. This asymmetry has informed strong diplomatic positions.

The Boe Declaration on Regional Security, adopted by Pacific Islands Forum leaders in 2018, explicitly identifies climate change as “the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific (Pacific Islands Forum, 2018).” Subsequent communiqués and speeches reaffirm climate change as the region’s primary security and existential threat, ahead of traditional military risks (UN Network on Migration, 2018).

From a normative standpoint, this positions PICs as key moral and political actors in global climate governance, despite their limited material power. Their leadership has been central in advancing agendas on 1.5°C, loss and damage, and climate-related human rights.

3. Barriers to progress

3.1 Political economy and institutional barriers in Australia

Several domestic constraints limit Australia’s ability to align its actions with its responsibility and vulnerability profile.

1. Political economy of fossil fuels: Coal and gas remain major export earners and sources of employment, especially in regional communities. This entrenches powerful industry lobbies and creates electoral incentives for governments to slow transition measures (The Australian Institute, 2020).

   
   

2. Incrementalism in climate targets: While the 2030 and 2035 targets represent progress compared with earlier inaction, they fall short of pathways compatible with 1.5°C and are framed as the “highest achievable” rather than the necessary contribution for a high-income emitter (Reuters, 2025).

   
   

3. Fragmented governance: Responsibility for climate adaptation and disaster management is split across federal, state and local levels, complicating integrated risk assessment and long-term planning.

   
   

4. Security framing gaps: The 2023 Defence Strategic Review and 2024 National Defence Strategy recognise that “climate change is now a national security issue”, but detailed climate-security assessment remains under-developed and is yet to be fully integrated into defence planning, according to security analysts (Australian GOV Defense, 2023).

These factors create a lag between strategic rhetoric and the scale of practical decarbonisation and adaptation investments.

3.2 Capacity and finance barriers in Pacific Island countries

Pacific Island countries face almost the opposite problem: they are highly motivated politically but constrained by capacity. Key barriers include:

• Limited fiscal space and high debt burdens, which restrict resources for adaptation, coastal protection and managed retreat (World Meteorological Organisation, 2024).

• Small, dispersed populations and remote geographies, raising per-capita costs for resilient infrastructure and early-warning systems (IPCC 6th Assessment Report, Pacific Islands, 2018).

• Dependence on external finance, including climate funds and bilateral aid, which is often unpredictable, slow to disburse or politically conditioned (Pacific Islands Forum, Climate Security Assessment, 2023).

• Data and capacity gaps in health and disaster risk management, with only a minority of small island developing states having comprehensive climate and health strategies (Climate: Small Islands Catastrophe, 2024).

These constraints amplify security risks by increasing the likelihood of unplanned displacement, governance stress and external strategic dependence.

3.3 International governance gaps

At the international level, at least three structural barriers impede effective action:

1. Weak enforcement mechanisms in the Paris Agreement, which relies on nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and peer pressure rather than binding emissions caps.

2. Equity disputes between high-emitting developed countries, emerging economies and vulnerable states about who should reduce emissions fastest and who should pay for adaptation and loss and damage (IPCC 6th Assessment Report, Pacific Islands, 2018).

3. Delayed operationalisation of loss and damage finance, leaving states like those in the Pacific without reliable mechanisms to address irreversible harms such as territorial loss or cultural dislocation (Washinton Post - Fiji Climate Change, 2025).

These governance gaps constrain the room for manoeuvre of both Australia and Pacific Island countries, even when domestic political will exists.

4. Climate change as a security issue in Australia and the Pacific

From a security and intelligence perspective, climate change operates primarily as a risk multiplier rather than a discrete threat. In Australia, the Defence Strategic Review highlights that climate change will increase demands on the Australian Defence Force (ADF) for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) both domestically and in the region, and that it must therefore be treated as a national security issue (Australian GOV Defense, 2023).

In practice, this manifests in:

• More frequent deployment of the ADF for bushfires, floods and cyclones, potentially distracting from core defence tasks and putting personnel under strain (IPCC, 2022).

• Increased demand for regional HADR operations, particularly when Pacific neighbours are hit by cyclones, storm surges or droughts (DFAT Australia, 2025).

• Infrastructure and base vulnerability, as coastal bases, ports and supply chains are affected by sea-level rise, flooding and heat (IPCC Climate Risk - Australisia, 2022).

For Pacific Island countries, climate change blurs the line between human security and state security. The Boe Declaration and subsequent regional assessments identify climate change as the region’s primary security threat, above traditional military risks (Pacific Islands Forum, 2018). Impacts include:

• Potential loss of habitable land and even statehood for some atoll nations due to sea-level rise and erosion (IPCC Climate Risk - Australisia, 2022).

• Displacement and internal or cross-border migration, raising questions about migration governance and the rights of “climate-displaced” populations (Washington Post, 2025).

• Stress on health systems from heat, vector-borne diseases and food insecurity (UN Environment Program, 2022).

• Strategic vulnerability, as external powers use climate finance, infrastructure investment and security partnerships to deepen influence in the region (DFAT Australia, 2025).

For both Australia and Pacific Island countries, this means that climate intelligence—systematic analysis of climate-related risks, exposure and vulnerability—must become a core component of national and regional security assessment.

5. Proposal: Integrating climate security into intelligence analysis and risk assessment

Responding effectively to the climate crisis in this region requires not only emissions reduction and adaptation projects, but also a reframing of how security institutions collect, analyse and act on climate-related information. The following recommendations are structured across domestic, regional and international levels.

5.1 Domestic reforms in Australia

1. Align emissions targets with responsibility and risk

   Revise the 2035 target towards the upper bound (or beyond) of the Climate Change Authority’s recommended range, in line with pathways compatible with limiting warming to 1.5°C (Reuters, 2025).

   Introduce a clear timetable for phasing out coal-fired power and ending new thermal coal and gas developments, recognising the exported emissions burden on vulnerable neighbours (Climate Change Tracker, 2025).

   
   

2. Embed climate security in national intelligence processes

   Establish a dedicated climate security analysis unit within the national intelligence community, mandated to produce regular assessments of climate-related risks, including tipping points, migration pressures, conflict potential and infrastructure vulnerabilities (Australian Peace & Security Report, 2025).

   Integrate climate scenarios into National Defence Strategy planning cycles, with red-team exercises examining simultaneous climate shocks and geopolitical crises (for example, a severe Pacific cyclone season coinciding with heightened US–China tensions) (Australian GOV Defense, 2023).

   
   

3. Rebalance HADR and civilian disaster capability

   Invest in civilian emergency management agencies and state-level services to reduce over-reliance on the ADF for domestic disaster response, allowing defence forces to focus on high-end regional contingencies while still supporting large-scale crises (ASPI Climate Change Impact on ADF, 2023).

   Climate-proof critical infrastructure—ports, bases, energy systems—using IPCC projections for sea-level rise, extreme rainfall and fire weather (IPCC 6th Assessment Report, Pacific Islands, 2018).

   
   

4. Whole-of-government risk mapping

   Develop a national climate risk register that brings together data from meteorological, health, defence, agriculture and finance agencies, supporting integrated risk prioritisation and resource allocation (WHO, 2025; UN Environment Program, 2022).

5.2 Regional cooperation with Pacific Island countries

1. Scale up predictable climate finance and adaptation support

   Commit to multi-year, untied adaptation funding through regional mechanisms, ensuring Pacific partners can plan long-term projects in coastal protection, water security and resilient agriculture (World Meteorological Organisation, 2024).

   Prioritise community-led relocation frameworks, drawing on lessons from early village relocations in Fiji, to minimise social and cultural trauma (IPCC Climate Risk - Australisia, 2022; Washington Post, 2025).

   
   

2. Strengthen regional climate intelligence and early-warning systems

   Expand the role and resourcing of the Pacific Fusion Centre, which already provides assessments on climate, human and resource security, to serve as a hub for climate-security analysis, involving both Pacific and Australian analysts (DFAT Australia, 2025).

   Invest in shared ocean and weather observation systems, marine heatwave monitoring and coastal risk mapping, building on WMO and IPCC findings for the Southwest Pacific (IPCC Climate Risk - Australisia, 2022; World Meteorological Organisation, 2024).

   
   

3. Support Pacific leadership in global forums

   Consistently align Australian diplomatic positions with Pacific Islands Forum communiqués that frame climate change as the single greatest threat to regional security, rather than treating climate as secondary to great-power rivalry (Pacific Islands Forum, 2018).

   Provide legal and technical assistance for Pacific-led initiatives, such as seeking advisory opinions from international courts on states’ obligations to protect the climate system and the rights of climate-affected populations (The Guardian, 2025).

5.3 International governance and corporate accountability

1. Advocate for a rapid fossil fuel phase-out

   Use Australia’s status as a major fossil exporter to champion, rather than block, agreements on coal phase-down, methane reduction and an end to new fossil fuel expansion (Live Science, 2025).

   
   

2. Support robust loss and damage mechanisms

   Push for rapid operationalisation and adequate capitalisation of loss and damage funding arrangements, with simplified access for small island states and clear guidelines for addressing slow-onset events like sea-level rise (IPCC Climate Risk - Australisia, 2022).

   
   

3. Strengthen corporate accountability

   Back international transparency standards and legal frameworks that hold major fossil fuel companies accountable for their contribution to climate damages, drawing on emerging evidence from Carbon Majors research and climate-damage attribution studies (The Guardian, 2025).

   From an intelligence and risk-assessment standpoint, these measures would reduce the probability of worst-case climate scenarios, enhance resilience in Australia and the Pacific, and limit openings for destabilising external influence in a region already experiencing geopolitical competition (DFAT Australia, 2025).

Conclusion

Climate change is already reshaping the security environment of Australia and the Pacific Islands. It is driven primarily by global fossil fuel use and ecological degradation; responsibility is heavily skewed towards high-emitting states and corporations, including Australia; and multiple political, economic and institutional barriers impede adequate responses. For Pacific Island countries, the crisis is existential; for Australia, it is simultaneously a domestic hazard, a regional security challenge and a test of international credibility.

For intelligence and risk-assessment communities, the central task is to treat climate change not as a distant environmental concern but as a core strategic variable. That means integrating climate data and scenarios into security analysis, recognising the asymmetric vulnerabilities of Pacific partners, and aligning national policies with both responsibility and risk. The proposals outlined above—strengthened climate-security analysis, ambitious decarbonisation, expanded regional cooperation and enhanced global governance—offer a pathway to address the climate crisis as a security issue while upholding Australia’s obligations as a neighbour and high-emitting state.

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